JOINT INTERAGENCY COORDINATION GROUPS (JIACGS), A TEMPORARY SOLUTION TO A LONG TERM REQUIREMENT
Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) operating within the Department of Defense (DoD) at the Combatant Commands following September 11, 2001 , have demonstrated that unprecedented success can be achieved when the elements of national power are coordinated and integrated together towards national strategic objectives. While
JIACGs were born out of necessity to fight the Global War on Terror, they are inherently a temporary solution to a long-term requirement. Much like the changes made in the military out of necessity by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the DoD and the other government agencies and departments must transform how they coordinate their resources, authorities and efforts in support of national strategic objectives. JIACGs may achieve an enduring future if they can evolve beyond the temporary institutional, bureaucratic and funding policies with which they were originally constrained. This paper will review the background that led to the creation of JIACGs, and will use a case study of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to examine US Government agencies' reaction to the JIACG concept, alternatives proposed to the JIACG and the experiences of USCENTCOM in implementing the JIACG. The conclusions drawn from the case study will be further explored in an effort to discern practical recommendations that may ensure an enduring, effective interagency process for complex contingencies and plans.
BACKGROUND
The United States Government uses the four elements of national power--diplomatic, informational, military and economic to address issues and threats to national security from state and non-state actors. Theoretically, these elements of national power may be employed individually, sequentially, in combinations or simultaneously by the government in proportioned response to a given situation. The United States Government employs these elements of national power via government agencies that are assigned specific responsibilities, authorities and capabilities.
Many of these agencies have overlapping responsibilities when it comes to application of elements of national power. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 , and the US Government response directed by the President necessitated a significantly less centralized and less bureaucratic interagency process to ensure the rapid combined application of all the elements of national power against Al Qaida and other terrorist groups with global reach. In February of 2001, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD1). It assigned oversight of ongoing working groups to provide coordination for ongoing operations. 5 The DoD was keenly aware of the need to integrate and synchronize its military strategy with the resources and capabilities extant in the other government agencies, especially in light of the events of 11 September, the prior efforts at interagency coordination, and the policy end-state of defeating terrorism. The question at the time was how best to accomplish this.
CASE STUDY -OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
The DoD, as the lead federal agency, is responsible for translating the national strategy In concept, a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is composed of military and civilian experts from various governmental agencies that have information, resources, and authorities as specified by United States law, which when combined produce results exceeding the sum of the parts. These experts bring with them knowledge of the unique capabilities, programs, and methodologies in their agencies which would otherwise not be known by the military planners. Ensuring that these other government agencies' capabilities and authorities, or lack thereof, are incorporated early in the planning process is essential. This allows the planers to appropriately assign tasks to military and other government agencies commensurate with their abilities, authorities and unique organizational missions. The members of the JIACG use enhanced situational awareness in order to effectively leverage and seamlessly integrate other government agencies' capabilities into DoD and Combatant Command level efforts. 6 The concepts of "if you build it they will come" or "hope as a method" seem to best define the strategy for effecting the interagency participation in DoD JIACGs. Establishment of JIACGs requires more than DoD resources; it also requires resources from other government agencies.
Funding to support the JIACGs was provided in the form of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM contingency funds from the DoD.
Despite the directive from the Secretary of Defense to establish JIACGs, and the personal guidance of the Combatant Commanders, getting military personnel with the right experience and skills to staff the joint billets in the JIACGs proved difficult. Those military personnel who had qualifications applicable to the interagency process also had skill sets that made them highly sought after within their own military directorates and commands.
AGENCY REACTION AND ALTERNATIVES
Achieving interagency buy-in to the JIACG organizations proved the most difficult task when it came to assignment of civilian personnel from the other government agencies. Despite PDD56 and the unprecedented level of focus and cooperation amongst the interagency, it took several months work at the Deputies level to resolve the issue of assignment of civilian personnel to the JIACGs on a temporary trial basis.
In an effort to effect the mandated and mutually desired interagency coordination, as well as to prevent any perceived erosion of individual agency authority or autonomy, almost all agencies including elements within the DoD immediately proposed alternatives to the JIACG to the Joint staff. To participate in the JIACGs as called for, each government agency would have to provide an experienced middle to high-grade (Government Service 13 to 15 equivalents) individual to each of the six Combatant Commands. The continuing Homeland Security and GWOT efforts were fully consuming the resources of all government agencies and the type of personnel required in the JIACGs were critical to each government agency's efforts for their own core functions. In addition to protection of individual agency equities, the basis of the following alternative proposals was primarily an attempt to mitigate the personnel resource requirement inherent in the JIACG concept.
The perceived "loss" of several individuals from each agency on a full-time basis was viewed as too costly and difficult. The return on investment was theoretical, and unproven. The preferred solution was to send an interagency representative to the JIACG only when required; this was deemed both feasible and supportable. Therefore, the first alternative was to return to a modification of the "pre-September 11 " mode of interagency coordination. These were same type of cobbled together interagency task forces that had been used to coordinate civil military operations in Vietnam, the War on Drugs, Operation JUST CAUSE, and the Balkans. To do this required the agencies and departments to provide liaisons to DoD JIACGs on a temporary basis when called for a specific event or plan. The problem with these task oriented interagency task forces was that these individuals brought with them an insular vision of their organization, a lack of continuity on the issue to which they were being asked to contribute, and often a lack of authority or accountability in committing an agency to a particular course of action. 
USCENTCOM JIACG
The experiences and successes of the USCENTCOM JIACG (where I served as the first J-3 and later as the Deputy Director), provide a sound model from which to draw insights and understanding of the requirements for successful interagency coordination and it is the model that will be examined in this paper (see Figure 1 below). Department agreed to contribute personnel to the USCENTCOM JIACG. These personnel were to serve as agency subject matter experts imbued with the authority to make decisions or given access to those who could authorize decisions.
At USCENTCOM, necessity and strong leadership finally overcame the lack of human resources and a select and extremely well qualified group of military and civilian personnel was The type of personnel required in the JIACGs cannot be grown overnight; however, they can be identified, groomed and trained. To ensure continuity, effectiveness and long-term seamless interagency coordination these personnel must be assigned to the JIACG for a period of not less than two years, and will require some education in both the interagency process and the organization of all participating agencies and departments.
The participation in the JIACG by agencies and departments of the United States
Government is an additive requirement imposed without sufficient resources in a time of unprecedented expansion of responsibilities and requirements to ensure both homeland security and national interests. To expect that agencies and departments will continue to participate "out of hide," even with the DoD footing the bill, assures varying degrees of nonparticipation. This does nothing to advance the JIACG from an evanescent organization which finesses the irreconcilable differences between the departments into an entity that ultimately changes the mechanism for how interagency coordination is effected. 13 On the surface, it would seem that a reasonable recommendation would be the creation of a specific interagency manpower account to pay for the various agencies and departments' participation in DoD JIACGs.
However, simply increasing the end strength in the various agencies with the understanding that additional personnel would be on long-term loan to the DoD will not work, as agencies and departments will resist this kind of micro management and external agency intrusion into their programs and policies. Likewise, giving the DoD additional resources to buy the personnel and services costs associated with cobbling together JIACGs at the Combatant . Upon publication, it will provide authoritative guidance to the Armed Forces on the requirements for interagency coordination. While this seminal publication should be used as the basis for any interagency coordination curriculum, the curriculum should also incorporate interagency views to include commonly appreciated interagency doctrine or protocols to facilitate organizational appreciation, responsive information sharing, moderation of bureaucratic obstacles, timely decision-making and unified action. 16 While I do not advocate that DoD is singularly the most qualified to teach interagency coordination, NDU was tasked to develop and conduct this training and has the highest likelihood of making such a program a near-term reality. Out of necessity, and for credibility, experts must present any such program from all agencies and departments. It needs to provide not only convergent views and success stories of interagency coordination, but also the differences and difficulties involved in the interagency process.
While this paper has primarily looked at JIACG development in USCENTCOM during
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, it is important to note that the USCENTCOM JIACG did not achieve the same level of success in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. This was largely due to many of the factors previously discussed, but specifically leader turbulence and the resultant shifting of mission and focus, rotation of personnel, and lack of involvement in drafting the Interagency Annex (Annex V) to the Campaign Plan. What is more troubling is that the military reverted to "when required" interagency planning and coordination during the run-up and execution of phases I through III (Deter, Seize Initiative, Decisive Operations) of the campaign, and looked late to the interagency for assistance with phase IV (Transition) of the campaign.
The alleged basis for the "when required" interagency coordination was due to the high level of secrecy surrounding the campaign plan, specifically the refusal of the DoD to authorize release of the campaign plan to the interagency citing operational security. Now that the NSC has approved the JIACG concept, it will take some time to assess
whether and to what degree the various agencies and departments will participate. Absent a more compelling mandate and the requisite accompanying means, it is likely that participation in
JIACGs by agencies and departments will be selective. In all likelihood, participation will be based upon a cost benefit analysis of the perceived direct and immediate return to agencies' or departments' core functions rather than a grand strategic view of the benefits obtained for
United States National Security.
With the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the GWOT, we are at a time in history when we are presented with a compelling reason for the US Government to transform how it cooperates at the executive branch level. Failing real renewed efforts by the agencies, departments and the NSC, the next step in the process of transforming United States Government interagency coordination may be taken by the Congress of the United States with legislation that mandates and defines an interagency cooperation solution. 18 Our National Security demands no less than a coordinated interagency process at the strategic and operational level.
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